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The Environmental Kuznets Curve from Multiple Perspectives 
 
Summary 
The analysis finds that in addition to U-shaped paths of environmental quality arising 
for growth in income per capita, growth in population can also produce socially efficient 
patterns that are U-shaped. Sufficient conditions for both types of paths are identified 
for a range of models and parameters, including symmetrical models with homothetic, 
constant-returns functions such as with CES functions. Similar results are also shown to 
arise in decentralized economies under either homogeneous or heterogeneous income 
levels.  
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The relationship between economic growth, natural resources, and environmental quality 
has been the subject of debate for centuries. The contemporary view that, if the economy is 
growing then so must environmental degradation, was advanced by Boulding (1966) and 
formalized in the materials-balance model of Ayres and Kneese (1969). More recently the “neo-
Malthusian” view has emphasized the fragility of the environment and the impact of economic 
and population growth on the natural capital stock.  Beginning in the early 1990s, however, 
empirical evidence began to emerge suggesting a U-shaped relationship between environmental 
quality and per capita income. This so-called “environmental Kuznets curve” suggested that 
environmental quality might first decline, and then improve, with rising per capita income 
(Grossman and Krueger 1993; World Bank 1992; Copeland and Taylor 2003),
1 and evidence of a 
U-shaped pattern for growth in population was observed by Patel, Pinckney and Jaeger (1995).  
The idea of an environmental Kuznets curve has elicited conflicting reactions. The 
strength of the empirical evidence has been studied extensively, but the results of those 
investigations have been inconclusive. Despite support for evidence of the relationship for some 
pollutants (Grossman and Krueger 1993; Panayotou 1993; Selden and Song 1994; Shafik and 
Bandyopadhyay 1992), others have reexamined the evidence and raised doubts about the 
findings (Stern and Common 2001; Harbaugh, Levinson and Wilson 2002; Millimet, List and 
Stengos 2003), while others question the generality of the pattern across different types of 
pollutants (Bradford, Schlieckert and Shore 2000; Chimeli 2007, Chimeli and Braden 2005) and 
the robustness of the empirical EKC relationships (Galeotti, Manera and Lanza, 2006; Deacon 
and Norman 2006; Perman and Stern 2003).    3
 Among the issues raised are questions about the value of using reduced-form models that 
abstract from any underlying growth-environment relationships, and also whether conflicting 
empirical findings for different types of pollution caste doubts on the existence of the 
phenomenon generally.  For overviews and surveys of the literature, see Stern, Common and 
Barbier (1996), de Bruyn (2002), Copeland and Taylor (2003) and a special issue of Ecological 
Economics (vol. 25, 1998).  
Evidence of these U-shape patterns spawned considerable speculation as to its underlying 
causes, including the suggestion that it is an artifact of structural changes in an economy as it 
passes through “stages of development” from agrarian to industrial where there is often a 
reliance on heavy, highly-polluting industries, and subsequently to high-income service and 
information economies which are inherently less polluting (e.g., Panayotou (1993)). A second 
explanation suggests that environmental quality is a “luxury good” emphasizing the role of a 
high income elasticity of demand for environmental amenities to lead countries to allow 
increased pollution as an acceptable side effect of economic growth (e.g., Arrow et al. (1995)).  
The implication of this second argument cautions against the interpretation that economic growth 
may be good for the environment, since the empirical evidence may simply reflect an 
international redistribution of pollution and polluting industries between relatively richer and 
relatively poorer nations, consistent with the so called ‘pollution havens’ hypothesis.  
Beginning in the mid-1990s a number of explicit theoretical models have illustrated 
several possible underlying mechanisms that can give rise to a U-shaped pattern for rising per 
capita income. According to Copeland and Taylor (2003), each of these models involves some 
restriction on either preferences or technology in order to generate the desired shape of the 
income-pollution path. The mechanisms by which these U-shape paths emerge are classified by   4
Copeland and Taylor as involving either income effects, threshold effects or increasing returns to 
abatement.
2  
For example, in the case of income effects, Lopez (1994) has demonstrated that when 
preferences are non-homothetic, a U-shaped pattern can emerge with rising per capita income 
provided that the income elasticity of the environmental good is sufficiently large. This provides 
formal treatment of the idea that when the environment is a luxury good, demand will rise at high 
income levels. Lopez also demonstrates, however, that when preferences and production are 
homothetic that monotonically rising pollution can be expected.  
The threshold effects class of models involves an initial range of income levels over 
which no abatement takes place. After some threshold has been breached, abatement begins to be 
implemented and pollution declines with rising income provided appropriate assumptions about 
technology and tastes. The models in John and Pecchino (1994), Seldon and Song (1995) and 
Stokey (1998) fit into this class. In Pfaff, Chaudhuri and Nye (2003) a similar result is developed 
under alternative assumptions about available ‘clean’ production techniques given Cobb-Douglas 
preferences.  
The third class involves increasing returns to abatement, for which Andreoni and 
Levinson (2000) use a simple model with increasing returns in abatement. As income rises and 
the scale of the economy grows, the relative cost of abatement declines relative to the cost of 
goods production. This attribute of technology produces a reversal from rising pollution toward 
declining pollution.  
Thus, for all three classes of models, then, there is a “built-in” asymmetry or curvature in 
preferences or in production which allows for a shift in outcomes away from pollution inputs or 
goods and toward non-polluting inputs or goods as growth proceeds, and this leads to the   5
possibility of a U-shaped trajectory. These examples offer important insights, yet it remains 
unclear how prevalent it may be to expect U-shaped patterns in the real world given the apparent 
requirement of asymmetries which make this possible. In our analysis below, we demonstrate 
that such asymmetries are not necessary to produce a U-shaped path.  
In addition, the existing literature has yet to evaluate the role of growing population as a 
component of economic growth and the environment, so that they offer a limiting 
characterization of observable contemporary growing economies which tend to exhibit both 
rising income per capita and rising population.  Indeed, although a number of these papers 
include explicitly dynamic processes where growth in income is endogenous, none has 
incorporated population growth, whether deterministic or endogenous, into these dynamic 
relationships.
3   
The current analysis builds on these recent contributions by including changes in 
population along side changes in income per capita as potential determinants of the 
environmental path. Moreover, we appeal to a framework in which both preferences and 
production technologies of arbitrary generality may be considered when examining the effects of 
economic growth on environmental quality. With this approach we extend the insights gained in 
the existing literature by identifying general conditions under which economic growth 
attributable to changes in essentially any set of economic parameters may lead to the 
improvement of environmental quality or, alternatively, its decline. We go on to consider 
decentralized economies and income inequality.  
Our analysis finds that a U-shaped pattern is possible with growth in population (holding 
income per capita constant), and for growth in income per capita (holding population constant) – 
although the conditions for a U-shaped path arise in the case of rising population is found   6
generally to differ from the conditions found in the case of rising income per capita. These 
results are obtained for a range of parameter values in conventional models, including standard 
symmetrical models involving homothetic, constant-returns to scale functions, such as simple 
CES models. These results are found to arise in part because environmental resources are 
characterized as “endowments” which tend to be relatively abundant initially, but become 
relatively scarce as growth proceeds, a shift which creates the possibility of a U-shaped path – an 
observation also noted by Pfaff, Chaudhuri and Nye (2003). Moreover, these results indicate 
plausible U-shaped trajectories for decentralized economies under either homogeneous or 
heterogeneous income levels.  
  In the next section we develop our general model and results for growth, addressing 
increasing income per capita separately from rising population. In section III we consider 
decentralized economies (that is, ones where government controls, coordination or collective 
action are assumed to be impossible or prohibitive in cost), as well as for equal and unequal per 




II. General Methods and Results 
 
We begin by introducing a general framework for analyzing the tradeoffs made between 
environmental quality and consumption in contexts of evolving social parameters such as per 
capita income, population levels, and resource endowments.  A simple static framework is 
employed to explore these relationships, where environmental damage is assumed to be short-  7
lived and stock effects can be ignored. This simplifying assumption will be a reasonable one for 
some kinds of air and water pollution which dissipate relatively quickly, but will be less 
satisfactory for biological resources which regenerate slowly, or for long-lived stock pollutants 
as in the case of climate change. These results will also be relevant to situations in which 
government decision makers themselves only have short run objectives. In that case, the 
behavior of a myopic social planner with regard to long-lived stock pollutants would be similar 
to that of a farsighted planner with short lived pollutants, assuming the single period structure is 
indistinguishable.  
The absence of environmental stock effects eliminates the need for a social planner to be 
forward-looking in terms of the environment. And we will abstract from the determinants of 
economic growth itself (including rising income and population) by assuming that there is an 
exogenous path of changes in “basic economic parameters” which in turn have a strictly 
monotonic impact on income and/or population. We further assume that agents have identical 
preferences and, as a starting point, equal incomes.  With these assumptions, a representative 
household approach implies that we can ignore intergenerational conflicts as well.  
Consider a population of identical consumers whose preferences over environmental 
quality e and private consumption c may be characterized by a strictly concave utility function; 
where e and c are assumed to be univariate for expository clarity.  Letting σ represent the profile 
of social parameters relevant to production possibilities, we define P(σ) to be the set of all (c, e) 
profiles that can feasibly be achieved for a representative consumer through some public policy, 
collective action, or other coordinating mechanism.
4  Note that that a central government is not 
assumed to be an all-powerful social planner. Indeed, the construction of P(σ) simply 
incorporates whatever influence a government or other coordinating institution is capable of   8
exerting.  The framework can represent a range of situations from coordination within a 
household to international treaties. As such, P(σ) can be thought of as a “per capita production 
possibilities” set.  P(σ ) is assumed to be convex and exhibit free disposal, the latter implying 
that if (c,e)∈P(σ ) and (c´,e´)≤(c,e) then (c´,e´)∈P(σ ). 
It is useful to introduce the concepts of production and consumption elasticities, where 
we define production elasticity at any point (c,e) on the production possibilities frontier as the 
frontier’s slope (in absolute value) divided by the ratio c/e, i.e., the percentage change in c 
divided by the percentage change in e.  Similarly, define we define consumption elasticity as the 
slope at this point on the corresponding indifference (in absolute value) divided by c/e.   We 
introduce these elasticity concepts because they allow us to succinctly articulate an insightful 
characterization of the impact arbitrary parametric changes have on environmental quality. 
 
THEOREM 1:  A parametric change will increase optimal environmental quality if and 
only if the change increases production elasticity relative to consumption elasticity at the initially 
optimal environmental quality level. 
 
Proof: Consider a shift from an initial profile of social parameters σ




0) denote the optimal outcome in P(σ
0), i.e., that which maximizes utility of the 
representative consumer, and let (c
1,e
0) be the point on the frontier of P(σ
1) corresponding to the 
original level of environmental quality e
0.  Convexity of P(σ
1) implies that if its frontier is 
steeper than the consumer’s indifference curve at (c
1, e
0), then the optimal environmental quality 
given σ
1 must exceed that given σ
0, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  The reverse must be true if the 
frontier is less steep. (Applying the definitions of production and consumption elasticity, it   9
immediately follows that the change from σ
0 to σ
1 will increase optimal environmental quality if 
and only if it leads to production elasticity that exceeds consumption elasticity at the point 
(c
1,e
0).      QED 
 
Theorem 1 thus provides a straightforward methodology for establishing whether or not a 
change in economic fundamentals will lead to an increase or a decrease in environmental quality 
at the social optimum. Indeed, this result establishes that one need only examine the relative 
impact the change in fundamentals will have on production and consumption elasticities.  If the 
production/consumption elasticity ratio increases (when evaluated at the original level of 
environmental quality), then the change in economic fundamentals will necessarily lead to an 
increase in socially optimal environmental quality, with the reverse being true if instead the 
production/consumption elasticity ratio decreases.  This reasoning applies equally to cases where 
per capita production possibilities have contracted (as illustrated in Figure 2). 
Economic environments in which consumers share Cobb-Douglas preferences provide a 
particularly transparent framework for examining “trajectories” of environmental quality as the 
corresponding consumption elasticities are everywhere constant.  A direct implication of 
Theorem 1 is that parametric changes in such settings induce increased environmental quality if 
and only if production elasticity is increased, a result we summarize in the corollary below. 
 
COROLLARY 1:  If preferences are Cobb-Douglas, then a parametric change will 
increase optimal environmental quality if and only if production elasticity increases at the 
initially optimal environmental quality level. 
   10
We now turn to a series of general expository examples demonstrating the application of 
these results. It is interesting to note that in each of these model types, growth in either per capita 
income or in population, can eventually lead to improved environmental quality.  
 
 
III. Expository Analysis 
 
III A. Growth in income per capita  
In this section we treat per capita income as a parameter of the economic environment, 
while holding population fixed.  Of course one can equivalently consider exogenously changes to 
“more basic” economic parameters, which in turn determine income level. The purpose here is to 
highlight some of the parametric changes that can give rise to U-shaped environmental paths. 
Three expository examples follow. The first model can be thought of as characterizing choices in 
production between polluting and non-polluting inputs or technologies. The second-model 
describes a polluting production technology, but where a secondary abatement technology exists 
which may be employed to limit environmental harms. The third model represents a more 
specific version of model 1, where both production and utility are CES functions.  
 
Model 1.  We first consider a model in which there are two inputs to the production of a 
private consumption good, the first being more productive but also more harmful to the 
environment than the second input.  Letting x1 and x2 represent employment levels of inputs 1 
and 2, production technology is characterized by a differentiable, increasing, concave per capita 
production function c=c(x1,x2).  That is, c(x1,x2) represents the quantity of private good each   11
representative consumer can enjoy when each consumer contributes the input profile (x1,x2) 
towards production.  (One can alternatively model aggregate production, which is then 
distributed amongst the population.)  Environmental quality will be characterized by e=E-δ(nx1), 
where E represents the initial endowment of environmental quality, n is the population size, and 
δ represents a differentiable, increasing, and convex environmental degradation function.  As we 
do throughout this paper, we measure inputs on a scale for which each unit has a price of 1 so 
that each agent’s budget constraint can be concisely represented by x1+x2=y; where y is per capita 
income.  Given per capita income y and a point (c,e) on the production possibilities frontier 
corresponding to positive levels of x1 and x2, and letting ci represents the partial derivative of c 















For instance, suppose that c is a concave function taking the form c(x1,x2) = c(x1+βx2) for 
some β<1.  It follows c/(c1-c2)=c/(1-β)c´.  For each given level of e, ε  is implicitly an increasing 
function of y.  (Simply note that given n, the value of e determines the values of x1 and δ´.  
Furthermore, if y is increasing, so too are x2 and the ratio c/c´.)  If one further assumes that 
preferences are Cobb-Douglas, an immediate implication of Corollary 1 is that the income 
trajectory of environmental quality is increasing in income for all income levels beyond which 
positive levels of input 2 are utilized.  For “low” income levels, e is plentiful relative to feasible 
levels of c and the optimal production plan will utilize only input 1, the most productive and 
polluting input.  Consequently, environmental quality is initially decreasing in income but   12
eventually becomes forever increasing in income, i.e., the income trajectory of environmental 
quality is “u-shaped.” 
  
Model 2.  Let us now suppose that output is an increasing, differentiable, concave 
function of input 1, i.e., the (per capita) production function is of the form c = c(x1).  Assume that 
input 2 is used solely to abate environmental degradation cased by the production process.  In 
particular, suppose that environmental quality is of the form e = E-δ(nc, nx2), where n denotes 
the population size, E denotes the initial level of environmental quality, and δ denotes a 
differentiable, convex environmental degradation function that is increasing in its first argument 
and decreasing in its second.  Given per capita income y, a point (c,e) on the production 
possibilities frontier corresponding to positive abatement efforts, and letting δ1 and δ2 denote 
partial derivatives of δ with respect to aggregate consumption and aggregate abatement, 
















For instance, suppose that c(x1) = kx1
b for constants k, b>0.  Further assume that 
whenever aggregate abatement expenditure is at least “one dollar” (nx2 ≥ 1) then δ(nc,nx2) = 
h(nc)
α/(nx2)
a for constants h, a, α>0.  For nx2<1 let δ(nc,nx2) = h(nc)
α.  The reader may note that 
the structural form δ(nc,nx2) = h(nc)
α/(nx2)
a emerges from a Cobb-Douglas “technology” for 
environmental degradation.
5  Assuming nx2 >1, the expression for ε provided in equation (2) can 
be reduced to ε=(δ/e)(α+ar/b), where r =λ/(1-λ) and λ=x1/y.  It follows that ε is increasing in y if   13
and only if r is increasing in y, which in turn occurs if and only if λ is increasing in y.  Implicitly 





a = constant (an identity which must hold if 
environmental quality is unchanged after the parametric shift in y) with respect to y and solving 




bα(1− λ)y + aλy
 
 
thus dλ/dy>0 if and only if a>bα.  If one further assumes that preferences are Cobb-Douglas, 
application of Corollary 1 implies that if a/α>b, the income trajectory of environmental quality 
will be increasing in income for all income levels beyond which nx2 >1.  In other words, unless 
abatement is ineffective relative to returns to scale in production of c, the income trajectory of 
environmental quality must be eventually increasing.   
 
Model 3.   In this model we assume that both the production and utility functions are of 
the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. Let c(x1,x2) = (a1x1
α + a1x2
α)




1/β  denote production and utility functions, where α,β≤1, α,β≠0, and a1,a2,b1,b2 > 0.  
Note that this model is symmetric in both production and utility; production is homothetic in x1 
and x2, and utility is homothetic in c and e.  
Assume environmental quality is of the form e=E-δ(nx1) for some increasing function δ 




























where the final equality follows by the fact that c=(a1x1
α + a1x2
α)




1/β = constant to identify the slope (de/dc) of a given indifference curve, 















 ( 4 )  
 
Letting r= x2/x1 and making use of equations (3) and (4), one can rearrange the inequality 




n ′ δ x1
1−βe
β−1 ≥ a1 + a2r
α ()
β−α
α a1 − a2r
α−1 ()  (5) 
 
Let e(y) denote the income trajectory of environmental quality and let e* =limy→∞e(y)≥0. 
Consider any value e´ which is on the income trajectory and “close” to e*.  Fix environmental 
quality at e´, thus fixing the left hand side of inequality (5), and consider increasing y beyond the 
point at which e(y)=e´.  Observe that as y diverges to infinity, so must r.  For large r, the right 
hand side of (5) is on the order of  a1 + a2r
α ()
β−α
α  which is decreasing in r and converging to zero 
if β<α, implying production elasticity is eventually increasing relative to consumption elasticity.    15
By Theorem 1 we may thus conclude the income trajectory of e must be eventually increasing 
whenever β<α, or equivalently, whenever the elasticity of substitution in the production function 
(i.e., 1/(1–α)) exceeds the corresponding elasticity of substitution in the utility function (i.e., 
1/(1–β)).  To the extent that society’s “essential,” or most important environmental goods (e.g., 
breathable air) are characterized by preferences with low elasticities of substitution, then they 
may also be the most likely to exhibit a U-shaped path. Inessential environmental goods 
(relatively high β), by contrast, may be less likely to exhibit a U-shaped path. 
For the case of rising levels of income per capita, the results from model 1 above are 
consistent with those found by Stokey (1998), and by Pfaff, Chaudhuri and Nye (2003), in which 
a threshold exists beyond which clean technologies inputs begins to substitute for polluting 
technologies or inputs. Model 2 results are similar to those found in Andreoni and Levinson 
(2000), indicating how increasing returns in abatement can produce a U-shaped trajectory.  
In the context of the CES functions in model 3, however, we can observe that it is not 
necessary to assume non-homothetic preferences, increasing returns to scale, or threshold effects 
in order to produce a U-shaped environmental path. All that is required is that the elasticity of 
substitution in utility be lower than the elasticity of substitution in production.  
 
III B. Growth in population  
The relationship between population, environmental resources, and economic growth is 
arguably the earliest question to be carefully studied in economics, including the dire predictions 
of Thomas Malthus. Contemporary theoretical and empirical literatures on this topic have 
sometimes been categorized into pessimists such as the neo-Malthusians, optimists such as Julian 
Simon (1981), and revisionists who contend that the effect of population on growth and resource   16
use varies with time, place, and circumstance (see Birdsall (1988)). Theoretical models have 
found that higher population growth will lead to lower environmental quality including models 
in which the natural resource has amenity value as well as productive value (see Robinson and 
Srinivasan 1997). Empirical studies in this area have generally asked whether there is evidence 
that population growth exacerbates environmental degradation in ways that are separate from the 
role of per capita income growth, implying that the sign of the effect is expected to be 
independent of income. In general, this literature has led to the suggestion that slowing 
population growth may be a way to halt the rate of environmental degradation (see, for example, 
Jha et al. 1993).  In part due to the emphasis on growth in income per capita in the empirical 
literature on the environmental Kuznets curve, none of the corresponding theoretical literature 
has included rising population despite it being a ubiquitous component of contemporary 
economic growth.  
With the present framework, we can readily examine the effects population growth may 
have on optimal environmental quality, which are not as obvious as they may superficially 
appear.  Indeed, superficial intuition may suggest that increasing the “number of mouths to feed” 
can only lead to increased environmental degradation.  The error in this superficial logic can be 
seen by noting that population growth will alter the (per capita) production possibilities and thus 
also alter production elasticities.  (Recall that we define production elasticity as the elasticity of 
the per capita production possibility curve.)  As such, Theorem 1 implies that the impact 
population growth has on the optimal level of environmental quality will depend on how much 
consumption elasticity changes relative to this increase in production elasticity: If production 
elasticity increases (decreases) relative to consumption elasticity then environmental quality 
must increase (decrease).  For many models, as we demonstrate below, population growth can   17
eventually lead to production elasticity increases that outpace consumption elasticity increases 
and thus lead to improved environmental quality. 
Readers may also note the apparent similarity between increases in per capita income for 
a given population size and increases in population size for a given per capita income.  Both lead 
to increased aggregate income for the overall economy.  It is important to note, however, that 
despite this apparent similarity, the two paths of enhancing aggregate income have completely 
different effects on the per capita production possibilities curve – increased per capita income 
will expand the per capita production possibilities set while population growth will contract per 
capita production possibilities (excepting special forms of increasing returns to scale production).  
Consequently, the precise effect aggregate income growth has on optimal environmental quality 
will depend on the manner in which this income growth was realized.   
Let us now return to our three expository models to examine how population growth may 
affect the environmental path in comparison to the results for income per capita.  
 
Model 1 (continued).  We now consider production elasticity as a function of n rather 
than y.  (For notational convenience we treat n as a continuous variable throughout this analysis.)  





.  It 
immediately follows that, at a given level of e, ε is increasing in n if and only if nc/(c1-c2) is 
increasing in n.  For instance, suppose c = (x1+βx2)








(1− β)nx1 + nβy
(1− β)a
 (6) 
   18
which is increasing in n (recall nx1 is fixed when e is fixed).   
The impact of increasing population is especially transparent when preferences are Cobb-
Douglas.  Indeed, if per capita income is sufficiently low (i.e., feasible consumption is low 
relative to e) then optimality dictates that all income is strictly devoted to the most productive 
(and most polluting) input and the incremental social income induced by an incremental 
population increase will also be devoted to the polluting input, causing further environmental 
degradation.  On the other hand, if per capita income is sufficiently high that some of the clean 
input is being employed (or is on the margin of being employed), then an incremental increase in 
population leads to an incremental increase in ε and Corollary 1 thus implies environmental 
quality must increase.  It follows that population increases induce an income trajectory that 
bottoms out at lower income levels and rises above the initial trajectory prior to the initial trough.  
Thus, the population trajectory of environmental quality (holding per capita income fixed) will 
itself be U-shaped as environmental quality will decrease at low population levels where 
“environment” is relatively abundant, and then increase once the environmentally friendly input 
begins to be used.  
 
Model 2 (continued). Recall that production elasticity in this model is increasing in 
λ=x1/y, and let us continue the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences.  Implicitly 





a = constant (which must hold if environmental 
quality is unchanged with the parametric shift in n) with respect to n and solving for dλ/dn yields  
dλ/dn = 
(a −α)λ(1− λ)
nb α(1− λ)+ aλ ()
 (7)   19
 
implying λ is eventually increasing in n only if a>α. We conclude that when a<α, population 
increases will decrease λ and thus, by Corollary 1, will necessarily lower the income trajectory at 
all income levels.  If a>α then population increases will lower the income trajectory initially (for 
those low levels of income at which no abatement investments are made), but once income is at a 
level where abatement investments are made (or on the margin of being made) then increasing n 
increases ε and thus Corollary 1 once again implies increasing environmental quality.  As in the 
previous model, it follows that increasing population causes the income trajectory to bottom out 
at lower income levels and rise above the initial trajectory somewhere before the initial trough.  
Here again the population trajectory of e with rising population will be U-shaped for constant per 
capita income levels.  
 







β−1 ≥ a1 + a2r
α ()
β−α




Holding environmental quality fixed, it follows that nx1 is fixed and the left hand side of 
this inequality must also be fixed.  Given P=nx1 and y fixed, the right hand side of the 




−1.  The precise relationship between population size and optimal 
environmental quality depends on the parameters a1, a2, α, β, as well as per capita income.  Even 
so, the signs α and β can be used to determine the direction of environmental quality for large n.    20
In particular, it is straightforward to show that in every case except for α and β both being 
negative, the right hand side of inequality (8) necessarily converges to zero, implying that 
environmental quality must eventually be increasing.  
If, on the other hand both functions reflect CES substitution possibilities that are 
inelastic, (i.e., α, β<0), then  a1 + a2r
α ()
β−α
α (a1 − a2r
α−1) converges to a1
β/α and n
−β diverges to 
infinity as n increases without bound.  As this implies consumption elasticity exceeds production 
elasticity in the limit, it follows environmental quality must be eventually decreasing.  
To summarize, these general results illuminate conditions under which both income 
growth and population growth can produce a U-shaped path. In the case of income growth, a U-
shaped pattern occurs if production was more flexible than utility in terms of the elasticity of 
substitution (β<α). For rising population, however, the relative magnitude of α and β do not 
distinguish U-shaped paths from other paths. Rather, only if both production and utility functions 
are inelastic (β,α<0) will a U-shaped trajectory not occur.  Underlying these results is the 
difference between commodity consumption which is a rival good and environmental quality 
which is non-rival. Because of this difference, economic growth derived from rising income per 
capita will expand the individuals’ production possibilities set whereas growth derived from 
rising population will contract the individuals’ production possibilities. Depending on how this 
expansion or contraction of the PPF interacts with indifference curves, a U-shaped path may 
arise.  
These findings are consistent with some prior empirical evidence found in the literature. 
For example, Patel, Pinckney and Jaeger (1995) find a U-shaped relationship between forest 
cover and population density (holding income constant) for rural Kenya.  In their study area, 
rural populations had long ago reduced tree cover densities relative to the initial endowment by   21
clearing land and collecting fuel wood, and recent increases in population density have forced 
reductions in average farm size.  However, these recent changes have been accompanied by 
increased tree plantings at the farm level, which in turn have resulted in higher numbers of trees 
per acre, or a U-shaped pattern between environmental quality (tree density) and population. In a 
second example, Cropper and Griffiths (1994) find evidence of an environmental Kuznets curve 
(inverted-U for rising income) for deforestation among non-OECD countries—although most of 
their observations fall to the left of the peak.  Their analysis shows that an increase in rural 
population density shifts this curve up (greater deforestation) in the case of Africa, and they also 
find that the turning point occurs at a lower per capita income in Africa than in Latin America.  
Both of these results are consistent with our theoretical models of population growth. 
 
III.C. Discussion  
For all three model types that exhibit a U-shaped trajectory for rising income, we show 
that rising population can also produce a U-shaped pattern even if income per capita is held 
constant.  Since contemporary economic growth generally involves increases in both population 
and income per capita, these results suggest the possibility of U-shaped trajectories in economies 
that are compatible with the parameters for either set of results.  
In the case of model 1, the existence of a threshold effect for the introduction of non-
polluting inputs or technologies implies that trajectories will show an eventual increase in 
environmental quality for rising income per capita or for rising population where preferences are 
Cobb-Douglas.  In the case of model 2 and Cobb-Douglas preferences, increasing returns to scale 
in an absolute sense, and relative to production of c, will eventually result in increasing 
environmental quality for generalized growth involving rising income per capita, and also for   22
rising population.  (Of course, the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences simply makes for 
convenient expository examples and it is not a necessary condition for such results.  The 
“threshold effect” exhibited in these examples is likewise an artifact of the simplistic expository 
framework adopted, as can be seen by considering the class of examples embodied in model 3.)   
However, in the case of model 3 we observe that having environmental quality be 
eventually increasing with rising income per capita is not predicated on the existence of 
threshold effects, increasing returns, or asymmetric preferences. The same is found for rising 
population. Indeed, so long as substitutions between inputs in the CES production function are 
elastic (i.e., 1/(1-α)>1) in an absolute sense, and also relative to the (CES) substitution elasticity 
in the utility function (i.e., 1/(1-α)>1/(1-β)), we can expect a U-shaped trajectory (where here we 
are referring to the CES definition of “elasticity of substitution”). In the case of rising 
populations, only where both CES functions have inelastic substitution possibilities will a U-
shaped path not arise.  
One aspect of the intuition for these results may be seen with reference to Figure 3 where 
per capita production and consumption possibilities for the two goods, c and e, are represented 
for the case of rising income per capita, but where the expansion of production possibilities is 
anchored to the upper left corner rather than the origin due to the initial endowment of E. Rather 
than expecting a rise in income to produce an expansion path emanating from the origin, in this 
case the path emanates from the upper left, and we can see the distinct possibility of a decline, 
followed by a rise, in environmental quality with the expansion of production possibilities.   
In the case of rising per capita income, as an economy moves from a situation where 
environmental quality is abundant relative to feasible levels of consumption to situations where 
environmental quality may be scarce relative to consumption opportunities. As a result, choices   23
may also shift from ones that are relatively “environment-using” to ones that are relatively 
“environment-conserving” (depending on production and consumption elasticities). In the case 
of rising population while holding per capita income constant, however, per capita production 
possibilities will contract in terms of feasible commodity consumption. The manner in which this 
may produce an optimal U-shaped path is illustrated in Figure 4. As the range of feasible 
commodity consumption opportunities declines relative to feasible e, it may not be intuitive why 
the optimal allocation would shift toward higher e and lower c, as illustrated in Figure 4. As 
population increases, however, an increasingly predominant use of the clean input will in the 
limit have a negligible effect on consumption but a large positive impact on (non-rival) 
environmental quality.  
  These results and intuition differ to some degree from those contributions to the recent 
literature in which some kind of asymmetry in preferences or technology is relied upon to 
generate a U-shaped path. One source of the contrasting findings in some of the recent literature 
stems from the way in which the environment has been modeled in the utility function. In the 
current analysis, utility is assumed to be increasing in environmental quality; whereas in some of 
the recent literature utility has been modeled as decreasing in pollution. Assumptions such as 
homotheticity in the first of these two models carry with them different implications than their 
symmetric counterpart in the second of these two models.
6   
When preferences are defined to be homothetic and constant returns-to-scale in terms of 
goods and environmental quality (E), and a starting point that is not at the origin but where e is 
initially abundant relative to c, the intuition for curvature in the environmental path becomes 
apparent as in figure 2. Thus, a priori restrictions imposing asymmetries in preferences or 
production are not necessary to produce a U-shaped path. Rather an inherent asymmetry in the   24
initial relative abundance of e versus c, when combined with standard, neutral assumptions about 
preferences, can generate a U-shaped path with rising income per capita or population.  
 
 
IV. Decentralized Economies 
 
We now consider the implications of a completely decentralized regime in which 
consumers need not be homogeneous.  To establish a baseline, we consider as our point of 
departure, decentralization with income distributed uniformly. 
 
IV A. Uniform Income Distribution 
In this framework, the production possibilities of a given agent i depend not only on 
individual income, but also the production decisions of other agents.  Letting the profile λ-i= 
(λj)j≠i  characterize the production strategies employed by each agent j≠i,  P(λ-i,σ) will represent 
the production possibilities set for a given agent i under decentralization.   We shall assume that 
for each parameter profile σ, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for the resulting non-
cooperative game in which agent i is free to unilaterally choose its own production strategy λi. 
Note that the production possibility sets in the centralized and decentralized settings are 
closely related.  Each point (c,e) on the frontier of P(σ) corresponds to some “production 
technology” λ which, if employed by all agents, results in an output of c units and an 
environmental quality level of e.  Thus if λ-i consists of a profile in which λj=λ for each j≠i, then 
the frontiers of P(λ-i,σ) and P(σ) will intersect at the point (c,e); where agent i is also choosing λ.  
Let us now further assume that for a given per capita income level, environmental degradation   25
can be written as a function of Σjλj and production by agent j is a function of λj.   (This was the 
case for each of our previous models as the ‘technology’ choice λ can be represented by λ=x1/y.)   
It follows that the production elasticity of P(λ-i,y) at the frontier point (c,e) is 1/n times the 
production elasticity of P(y) at the same point.  A direct implication of this proportionality is that 
for each of our specific classes of models 1, 2, and 3, the income trajectory of environmental 
quality shares the same qualitative shape in both centralized and decentralized regimes. 
 
  IV B. Income Inequality 
We now consider how income inequality may affect these results.  The relationship 
between income inequality and the provision of a public good has been considered in other 
contexts. Olson (1965) and others have shown that inequality can play a positive role whereby 
the greater the share of collective benefits for collective action for a single member, the greater 
the propensity of this ‘large’ member to bear the costs involved.  However, when inequality is 
large, ‘small’ users may be encouraged to free ride on the contribution of the ‘large’ contributor 
in such a way as to produce an offsetting effect.  More generally, in situations where the set of 
contributors to the public good may change, income inequality has an ambiguous effect on the 
provision of a public good (Baland and Platteau 1997).     
In the context of the current model, the results above can be readily applied to income 
inequality and its implications for environmental stewardship.  Consider an example of Model 1 
for which c=(x1+βx2)
a and δ(nx1)=bnx1 for some a,b>0 and where all agents share identical 
Cobb-Douglas preferences.  Let y continue to denote average per capita income, but now some 
agents will receive less and some more than this average.  Formally, the total population N  (size 
n) is partitioned into the set of poor agents , Np (size np), and the set of rich agents, Nr (size nr).    26
Incomes of poor and rich are respectively represented by y(1-θp) and y(1+θr), where θr ,θp∈ (0,1) 
and npθp= nrθr , thus average income equals y as claimed.   
The equilibrium income trajectory for decentralized choice in this setting is calculated in 
much the same way as previous models.  When incomes are low, all agents exhaust all of their 
income on the most productive and most polluting input.  As average income rises, the rich are 
first to reach a threshold at which they begin using the less productive but less polluting input.  
In this setting, income inequality will thus initially have a positive effect on environmental 
quality.  Suppose that for a given average income and income differential parameters θr and θp, 
the rich are just barely willing to begin investing in the less polluting input.  Then an increase in 
the income differential, but keeping average income unchanged (increase in θr and 
corresponding decrease in θp) will make the rich inclined to allocate more income in the less 
polluting input so that environmental quality must increase.  
As average income increases, the rich continue to shift resources toward the 
environmentally benign input while the poor continue to exclusively utilize the most productive 
input until they reach a threshold where they too wish to begin directing resources elsewhere.   
Eventually an income level is reached where the rich will devote all of their income solely to the 
‘clean’ input, and where this would also be the case if they were at the average income level. At 
this point the poor devote relatively more of their income to the polluting input compared to what 
would be the case at the average income level.  Consequently, there necessarily comes a point 
where the income trajectory for equal incomes and that for unequal incomes will cross, after 
which the unequal income trajectory drops below that of equal income.   
As an overall summary of this model, income inequality is initially beneficial to 
environmental quality, but at ‘high’ average income levels it eventually becomes detrimental.    27
This result is germane to discussions of social policy. For example, the suggestion has sometimes 
been made that environmental and equity goals may reinforce one another.  Our findings suggest 
that this may only be true at high income levels, in which case economic growth may represent a 
means to strengthening the desirable complementarity between these two social goals.    
 
V. Concluding comments  
 
We have shown that economic growth characterized by increases in either population or 
income per capita can often produce a U-shaped pattern. In the case of rising income per capita, 
this result is due in part to the fact that an initial endowment of environmental resources will tend 
to be abundant relative to consumer goods during early stages of growth, but become scarce 
relative to consumer goods as growth proceeds. Rising population, by contrast, causes per capita 
production possibilities to contract in terms of feasible commodity consumption. In this situation, 
an increasingly predominant use of the clean (or cleansing) input will, in the limit, have a 
negligible effect on consumption but a large positive impact on (non-rival) environmental 
quality.   
Thus, our analysis finds that for broad classes of theoretical models, and in Pareto 
efficient as well as unregulated economies, environmental quality will follow a U-shaped 
trajectory. These results reinforce and build on a recent literature that has emphasized rising 
income per capita as a possible determinant of a U-shaped trajectory.  We find also that the 
likelihood of a U-shaped pattern with growth does not require any particular predisposing 
assumption such as increasing returns, non-homothetic preferences, or income elastic 
consumption.    28
To the extent that environmental doomsayers have based their pessimistic forecasts on a 
linear extrapolation of past trends, the analyses here offer a more hopeful rendering.  In a fashion 
similar to life-cycle working hours where rising labor supply during the early decades of life do 
not imply unending hours of labor late in life, increased environmental degradation during early- 
or middle-stages of growth may only represent the initial downward slope of a U-shaped 
trajectory, rather than a secular trend.  These results do not, of course, suggest that economic 
growth necessarily contains any automatic, self-correcting mechanism for eliminating inefficient 
levels of environmental damage.  Optimal environmental allocations can only be expected to 
occur in the presence of effective social, economic, and political institutions that correct for 
property rights failures and complex coordination problems.  In decentralized economies the 
extent of free riding may make the path’s nadir socially unacceptable or even lethal.  
Although our static model does not permit explicit evaluation of dynamic questions, it is 
straightforward to consider, at least at a general level, how the presence of long-lived stock 
effects or, in the extreme, irreversible environmental damages represents a situation where 
failure to recognize the U-shaped-ness in the trajectory (i.e., the trajectory that would be possible 
in the absence of stock-effects or irreversibility) would lead to sub-optimal allocations. Similar to 
the failure to recognize the foreseeable rise in the “relative price” of environmental quality as 
incomes rise, a myopic policymaker who overlooks the inherent U-shaped-ness of an 
environmental trajectory will unwittingly exceed the optimal level of degradation by not 
recognizing the future rise in the desired level of environmental quality. In the case of 
irreversible damage, this will constitute a permanent social loss. While there is little evidence 
that policies are generally made in anticipation of U-shaped trajectories or rising environmental 
values, counterexamples such as the early establishment of national and urban parks and   29
wildernesses areas are often described as visionary.  Such foresightedness, however, has not been 
part of economists’ standard methodologies where current values have generally been assumed 
to be the best proxy for future values, and where U-shaped trajectories for rising incomes and 
population have not been taken into account. These concerns may be especially relevant in cases 
such as species extinction, ozone depletion, and climate change.   
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Figure 1. PPF expansion: Indifference curve I2 is less steep than P(y
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Figure 2. PPF Contraction: Indifference curve I2 is less steep than P(y
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1 See also Seldon and Song 1994, Shafik 1994, Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995, Grossman 1995, 
and Cropper and Griffiths 1994.  
2 In addition, Copeland and Taylor (2003) consider a fourth “sources of growth” explanation 
involving a shift from polluting to non-polluting industries.  
3 Moreover, identifying the impacts of poverty on population growth and the environment has 
been a complex and contentious task given their joint endogeneity and inconclusive empirical 
basis (see Robinson and Srinivasan 1997, Dasgupta 1993, and Birdsall 1988). 
4 We assume that public policy will induce identical consumers to behave identically.  Later in 
this paper we consider economies with nonhomogeneous consumers. 
5 To see this, take nc to represent “potential pollution” which must be accounted for either 
through abatement efforts or actual pollution. The substitution possibilities between abatement 
and environmental waste disposal can be constructed in Cobb-Douglas form so that this 
relationship is expressed as nc=h′(nx2)
a′δ
α′ for positive constants h′, α′, and a′.  Letting a= 
a′/α′, α=1/α′, and h=(1/ h′)
α, then solving for δ yields δ = h(nc)
α/(nx2)
a as claimed. 
6 Like most prior studies, Lopez defines utility as decreasing in pollution rather than increasing in 
environmental quality. Assuming preferences are homothetic under this configuration, he finds 
that growth will necessarily lead to more pollution. However, the assumption of homotheticity in 
terms of pollution is implicitly contradicted by Lopez’s own claims that pollution has “maximum 
tolerable limits.” Indeed, no such limits can exist if doubling output and pollution will always 
increase welfare, as would be the case if homotheticity prevails. The present analysis avoids such 
inherent inconsistencies and in addition finds that a U-shaped path is quite possible in models   38
                                                                                                                                                             
with homothetic preferences, but where preferences and homotheticity have been defined in 
terms of goods (environmental quality) rather than bads (pollution). NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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